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The Neo-conservative Project  
Hegemony, as neo-cons argued in the 1990s, is not the mere possession of dominating 
power but also the will to use it on behalf of a coherent project.  In the Clinton years, hegemony 
was only latent. The catastrophe of September 2001 created the circumstances in which it could 
be made real. To what end? There is not yet a single comprehensive statement of the neo-
conservative project and its premises. Still, out of the particular policies advocated by its high 
priests and house organs and the thicket of argument surrounding them, project and premises 
materialize.1
Having won the Third World War, conventionally called the “Cold War,” we are now by 
dint of circumstance launched into a fourth. Like the second and third ones, it stems from a 
conflict of values and not of mere interests. It is a war between democratic capitalism and its 
enemies. The former is expanding, not at the end of a bayonet but in response to the desire of 
people everywhere to receive it or at least its blessings. And that expansion is coterminous with 
the expansion of individual freedom. 
1 Professor and Dean, Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver.  All rights reserved.  
Reproduction requires the express written consent of the author. 
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The expansion coincidentally threatens where it does not immediately demolish the 
practices, beliefs, and institutions that thrive only where freedom is alien and can be made to 
remain so. As the financial and cultural base of the expansion that is sometimes labeled 
“globalization”, the U.S. is the inevitable target for all those who, being threatened, resist. And 
since globalization is not a public policy but the summation of millions of private initiatives 
responding to the yearnings and passions of billions of people, the U.S. government cannot erase 
the bull’s eye from the nation’s flank by any policy other than attempting to remake the nation in 
the image of its enemies, a closed society.  
 So war is our fate. A conventional war would be a minor affair for a country with 
America’s power. But in the epoch of globalization, we must contend with asymmetrical war. 
Since the enemies of the open society cannot stand up to our armies, they turn to such soft targets 
as civilians and the infrastructure that supports them. Here our enemies find vast vulnerabilities 
springing from the very nature of our open society and the delicate systems of communication 
and movement and energy generation that sustain quotidian life. The destruction of the World 
Trade Center illustrated the lethal potential of asymmetrical war even when waged without 
benefit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Add them to the mix, and images of 
unspeakable catastrophe are summoned. 
 As America is the center of expanding liberal capitalist democracy, the Islamic world, 
particularly its Arab sector, is the center of violent opposition precisely because the dynamism 
and pluralism and instrumental rationalism of liberal capitalism challenge deeply rooted social 
arrangements and identities.  And this challenge occurs against a backdrop of nearly a 
millennium of armed conflict between the West and the various Islamic polities on the southern 
side of the Mediterranean and, in recent centuries, a succession of devastating military defeats 
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and political humiliations for the latter. Added to this dangerous mix is a strain of sacrificial 
violence in contemporary if not original Islamic thought which leads to the suicide bomber. 
 What, then, is to be done according to the Neo-Cons? A first step is to seek out and 
destroy immediate threats and demonstrate that American power is now driven by an implacable 
will and a universal capacity to revenge every injury by inflicting greater ones. Being hated is 
not good; being hated without being at the same time feared is far worse. In destroying the 
Taliban regime and killing or incarcerating various Al Qaeda members, the first step was taken. 
Going after Saddam also has had demonstrative value. For the Taliban were barely a regime, 
virtually unrecognized and not fully in control of the country they misruled. Destroying its 
regime and doing so largely through reinforcing and bribing indigenous actors was at best a 
veiled warning to established governments with histories of support or tolerance for terrorist 
groups. Destroying the long-established regime in Iraq, one not credibly connected to September 
11, was a dramatic expansion of the anti-terrorist project, calculated to be a qualitatively more 
potent demonstration of American will and power.  
 If one is to take neo-conservatives at their word, however, “encouraging others” was only 
one of the reasons to overthrow Saddam Hussein. A second was to create the condition for 
installing a capitalist democracy in the once most formidable and technologically advanced 
country in the Arab world.2 This too would be done in part for its hopefully contagious effects on 
the surrounding Arab states, a hope flowing from a key, if not always clearly declared, premise 
of neo-conservative grand strategy: Given the opportunity, ordinary people will prove to be 
rational maximizers of their material well being. To serve its interests and theirs, the United 
States should  provide the opportunity, as it provides the quintessential model: strict limits on 
state power; the rule of law including transparency of the public realm; an independent judiciary; 
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extensive rights to private property associated with constitutional limits on the confiscatory 
power of the state; and free elections to sustain the rest. The individual, being protected from 
depredations by the state is thereby liberated to pursue material well being. And pursue it he or 
she will, for that is the natural impulse of men and women, if not in all ages, then certainly in 
ours. 
The ethic of consumption will trump all other ends. An electorate of economic strivers 
will disown projects that conscript their wealth on behalf of utopian ends. For they will find 
dignity and meaning in the struggle to produce and sufficient pleasure in the satisfaction of their 
appetites. That is why liberal democracies do not war with each other. To be sure, fanatics 
immune to the ethic of material consumption will not altogether disappear. But they will no 
longer be able to multiply themselves so easily. And liberal democratic governments, driven by 
the coercive power of elections to mirror the interests of their electors, will cooperate with the 
U.S. to extirpate fanatics. 
 Neo-cons do not rely exclusively on a contagion of democracy springing from the 
demonstration in Iraq of the possibility and the benefits of democratic government. While the 
visible freedom, peace and affluence in Iraq will weaken from within the stagnant autocracies of 
surrounding Arab states like Syria and Saudi Arabia, the U.S will encourage them with positive 
and negative incentives to manage a transition to open societies for the benefit of the Arab 
people in general and for ours. And for Israel’s too because citizens of open societies will no 
longer have grounds to rage at their fate—rage which today’s Arab governments deflect to Israel 
first and then to the United States.3
After September 11's demonstration of American vulnerability to asymmetrical warfare, 
this vision, to the extent it is credible, could draw support from traditional conservatives 
5
Farer: Human Rights and the Neo-Conservative Project: What’s Not to Like
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2004
5
concerned primarily with maximizing the security and the wealth of the nation, as well as those 
who a priori equate U.S. and Israeli security interests. Should it not appeal as well to human 
rights activists and to the wider universe of liberals and social democrats? Can one believe in the 
universality of human rights and not embrace a strategy that purports to merge realism and 
idealism in the cause of freedom? Apparently so, since most of the established organs and 
prominent advocates of liberalism and social democracy and most of the leading figures and 
institutions in the international human rights world have reacted along a spectrum ranging from 
intense skepticism through selective criticism to comprehensive hostility toward the Bush 
administration’s grand strategy.4
Grounds for Doubt: A Human Rights Perspective 
What’s not to like here? Is the skepticism a merely visceral response to the conservative 
messenger? Or are there reasoned grounds, rooted in liberal values and the deep essence of 
human rights, for not embracing this program? Actually, taking the messengers’ identity into 
account is entirely reasonable, part of the seasoned wisdom of everyday life. For in our quotidian 
existence, we do not entrust things we value except to persons who over the years have created 
grounds for trust. And there are essentially two reasons why we trust people. One is that they 
have a record of fulfilling their commitments and the other is that we have common values, a 
conviction also rooted in experience, which is particularly important where the mission we are 
called upon to entrust to the messenger has as its very purpose the advancement of our values, in 
short the case before us.  
If our end is the broader realization of human rights, there are substantial reasons to 
distrust the right-wing executors of contemporary American foreign policy. As noted above, 
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when George W. Bush sought the presidency, he disowned use of the coercive power of the U.S. 
where the only potential gain in a given case would be protection of human rights. This was also 
the position of his national security advisor.5 But the case for skepticism does not rely simply on 
the place of human rights in the President’s initially declared hierarchy of concerns.   In addition, 
his  Secretary of Defense had  served as a special envoy to Saddam Hussein during the Reagan 
administration, when it was assisting the dictator whose aggression against Iran had backfired to 
the point where, without extensive external support, he faced utter defeat.6 It was during this 
period that Saddam employed lethal chemical weapons against both the Iranians and the Kurdish 
population of Iraq without in any way compromising American support for his regime.  
Donald Rumsfeld is simply a “for instance.” Many senior members of the current 
administration served in the earlier Bush administration when it stood idly by as Yugoslavia 
disintegrated and Serbia initiated mayhem in Croatia and Bosnia. To be fair, they do not have 
more to answer for morally than the Clinton administration that also wrung its palsied hands as 
Slobodan Milosevic and his colleagues murdered their way around the Balkans and actually 
discouraged action during Rwanda’s slow-motion genocide.7 But Clinton never promised us a 
no-holds-barred crusade for liberal democracy and did not ask the American people to entrust 
him with wartime power to spread the American Way.8
One could, moreover, argue that, if we are going to ground skepticism on past words and 
performance, we need to disaggregate realist conservatives like Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice 
from neo-conservative officials like Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz or the National 
Security Council’s Elliott Abrams, or pundits like Charles Krauthammer.9 Even if it is hard to 
credit the traditionalists with a Pauline epiphany in September 2001, have the neo-cons not been 
at least rhetorically consistent? Indeed, is not a declared commitment to Wilsonianism with fixed 
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bayonets a defining feature of neo-conservatism?10 Thus, the problem seems less that of the 
messenger’s sincerity than it is of the humanitarian implications of the message itself. 
A crusade for democracy, even full-blown liberal democracy, overlaps but is not 
synonymous with a crusade for human rights. Moral criteria for evaluating the exercise of power 
stretch into the remote past.11 At least the first generation of civil and political rights, rights that 
have evoked the widest consensus about their imperative quality, is focused on the individual, 
not the wider community. More than that, they are claims that the community cannot trump or 
subordinate to some presumed general good which, while causing injury to a few, enhances the 
welfare of the many. 
It is conceivable that a good faith effort to implant liberal democracy throughout the Middle 
East and in other areas where it is largely absent, an effort carried out in part by war, armed 
subversion, assassination, and other instruments of coercive statecraft, might in the long course of 
history enhance human well being beyond anything that could be achieved through such non-violent 
means as education, economic incentives, financial and technical assistance to democratic 
movements, and improving the welfare consequences of democracy so as to increase its attractions.  
But even if, by means of divine revelation, we could be certain that human welfare would in the long 
term be better served by a violent statecraft, if one were committed to the view that human rights 
are trumps, then one might still oppose a crusade for democracy. Why? Because the taking of 
innocent lives is an inevitable consequence of a violent crusade for whatever end. One particularly 
awful instance occurred during the invasion of Iraq, when a missile flying off course struck an 
apartment complex wiping out a child’s immediate family, ripping off his arms, and crisping his 
body.12 Since civilians were not targeted—on the contrary it appears that the U.S. military made an 
unusual effort to minimize civilian casualties13—this lad’s horror is entirely consistent with the 
humanitarian laws of war.14 At the same time, however, it is in a state of considerable tension with 
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the deep values that anchor the idea of human rights 
Pain and death inflicted predictably albeit unintentionally on the innocent rubs across the 
grain of human rights in any war of choice rather than self defense. And that would be the case 
whether the choice is made for the purpose of preserving American freedom of action or 
extending the incidence of democracy.  Consistent with their stated faith, neo-cons are prepared 
to make war not simply for the immediate purpose of installing elected governments, but also for 
the more general one of maintaining American hegemony indefinitely as is now enshrined in the 
National Security Strategy of September 2002.15 They would do so, not for or at least not only 
for narrow chauvinistic purposes, to be sure, but because, as the neo-conservatives see it, a 
hegemonic America will assure or is at least the best means of assuring the long-term triumph of 
liberal democracy and hence the greater good of humanity.16 Of course for traditional 
conservatives, hegemony needs no justification beyond the influence and wealth and presumably 
security it brings one’s own nation in a world of nations; for them the tribal good does not have 
to be wrapped in the politically correct colors of the general good. 
Is there any tension between the traditional realist and the neo-conservative world views? 
And if there is, should those who define the good in terms of the more effective defense and 
promotion of human rights prefer the triumph of the traditionalists or of the crusaders? 
Prominent traditionalists like Henry Kissinger17 and Brent Scowcroft18 either supported without 
enthusiasm or opposed the Iraq war. So did their ideological brethren in academia.19 
In a state that for good reason feels the tide of history running against it, a state that feels 
geo-politically insecure, as Germany did when it ignited the First and Second World Wars,20 
realists may be risk takers. And few risks are consistently greater than the risk of war. But in a 
country like the United States–wealthy, cohesive, and without any rival in sight–realism will 
generally operate as a restraint on military adventures.  
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The one thing certain about armed intervention is the death and mutilation of the 
innocent—like the inhabitants of the asylum for the mentally ill in Grenada inadvertently 
pulverized by invading U.S. forces21 or the several hundred or more humble people of Panama 
killed by chance when President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. forces to serve an arrest 
warrant on General Manuel Noriega and to restore “democracy” there.22 Because the core human 
rights are imperative claims by individuals not open to trumping by some supposed long-term 
general good, a crusade to defend them has built-in restraints that a crusade for the general 
expansion of democracy does not. For in the former case, we are constrained at least to balance 
the lives hopefully saved against those we will take in order to save them. But if democracy 
alone is the end, then as long as we are confident that some will survive to hold free and fair 
elections, what matters the cost in human life other of course than the lives of our own troops? 
This may seem like an unfair reductio ad absurdum, carrying the logic of the neo-conservatives’ 
position beyond the point most of them would probably follow it. Yet, in fact, it is grounded in 
experience.  
In the deadly Central American conflicts of the 1980s, neo-cons personified by Elliott 
Abrams passionately defended, indeed helped to organized and sustain, the U.S.-organized 
insurgency against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government.23 While this use of American power had 
a thin Cold War rationale, publicly its most ardent defenders invoked the virtue of struggling for 
democracy.24 A settlement based in large measure on an internationally-supervised election 
ultimately occurred, but only after the death of forty thousand people in a population of less than 
three million and this on top of the roughly forty thousand killed in the revolt against the Somoza 
family regime that had survived for 47 years, thanks in part to U.S. patronage.25 
Peace came to Central America when President George H.W Bush and his top foreign 
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policy associates, all traditional conservatives, decided that after the Cold War a conflict in 
Central America was a distraction.26 Elections under international supervision in both Nicaragua 
and El Salvador were a means to the end of liquidating this distraction, not an end in itself. And 
there seems little doubt that even if the Sandinistas had won their election, as many including 
them expected, Bush senior would have regarded the matter as settled. Neo-cons, on the other 
hand, believing that the Sandinistas, as a leftist regime, were by their nature undemocratic, might 
well have continued the conflict if they had then controlled American foreign policy. 
 
Conclusion 
Looking forward, the greatest humanitarian risk from the neo-cons’ tendency to discount 
the particulars of collateral damage in favor of the general goal of promoting democracy may lie 
in Asia rather than the Middle East.  There China, with its authoritarian government and 1.25 
billion people, is a natural target for their zeal. Anyone who cares at all for human rights hopes to 
see China evolve into a state where rotation in office achieved through fair elections at all levels 
of government helps to discipline elites and to widen the scope of personal freedom. Meanwhile, 
the progressive dismantling of the Maoist economy since 1979 and the corresponding growth of 
a market economy open to foreign investment and, concurrently, to transnational cultural forces, 
have already effected both a measure of personal liberation inconceivable during the long 
decades of Mao Tse Tung’s dictatorship and a remarkable reduction in poverty.27 
Imagining a greater calamity for human rights and welfare than a renewed Cold War  
between the United States and China is difficult.  Among its predictable byproducts would be 
reduced freedom for the Chinese people to express opinions, to move within the country, to 
travel abroad, to complain about and publicize corruption, to have access to foreign ideas and to 
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shape their careers. Moreover, by deflecting additional resources into an arms buildup and 
reducing foreign involvement in China’s economy, a cold war would reverse the trend toward 
the reduction of poverty in that huge country.  
Does it then follow that human rights advocates should look to the conservative realists 
as allies albeit of convenience? Probably not. In the first place, realists come in two forms, the 
prudent and the adventurous or, in academic discourse, the defensive and the offensive, the latter 
believing that states generally do and in all cases should seek to maximize their power, that the 
idea of a mere “sufficiency” of power is absurd.28 The first type of realist, epitomized today by 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the former National Security Advisor, General 
Brent Scowcroft, are sensitive to the risks of trying to reshape the international system’s norms 
and actors. They are seemingly alive to the danger, among others, of provoking a hostile 
coalition of states who, were it not for their shared opposition to domination by an ambitious 
hegemon apparently unrestrained by long-accepted rules of the game, would have relatively little 
in common. And in a world of potentially catastrophic terrorism, they are cautious about 
swelling the pool of recruits for the terrorist project and making the United States its favored 
target.  
That, at least, is how I construe the former’s grudging support for the war in Iraq and the 
latter’s open opposition. But what centrally characterizes them is their intellectual eclecticism. 
Their realism is not rigorous. Both are supporters of constructive engagement with China 
through trade and other exchanges. Yet trade and foreign investment help drive, arguably are the 
critical ingredients of China’s rapid economic growth which in turn helps sustain political 
stability. If rapid growth continues for another twenty years, China will be the only state capable 
of challenging American hegemony in Asia. For that very reason the leading offensive realist in 
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the academic world, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, urges adoption of 
economic measures that would slow China’s growth, although even he stops short of celebrating 
preemptive war.29 Kissinger’s advocacy of engagement, both bi-lateral and multilateral, implies 
belief that a more developed China and the United States are not inevitable enemies, that they 
share or through their interactions could come to share the view that they have far greater 
common interests than differences in an international system much like the present one which 
works well for the United States. In short, Kissinger’s China policy is more easily reconciled 
with non-realist theories that attribute causal value to institutional arrangements and subscribe to 
the idea that national interests are not given but rather constructed through the interaction of state 
elites.  
But there is another species of realist, personified by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and Vice-President Richard Cheney, who apparently join the neo-conservatives in 
discounting the danger of flouting long-established practices and norms and magnifying the 
decisive effect of military power. Today, when their focus is on terrorism, they are seemingly 
happy to accept China as a cooperative state. But given the centrality of military power in their 
world view, if and when the present sense of immediate danger passes, they could be as 
susceptible as the neo-conservatives to a policy of confrontation with China.  
If constraining American power were the optimal strategy for promoting humanitarian 
ends, human rights advocates might reasonably seek an alliance with resurgent realists in the 
Kissinger-Powell mode. But surely it is not. For realists of all stripes would have tolerated 
butchery in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The Congo’s agony 
and the bloody convulsions of Liberia have little purchase on their moral imagination because 
they have no place in their grand strategy, any more than does a renewed Afghanistan as opposed 
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to one where sufficiently accommodating commercially-minded war lords regulate the rubble. 
The neo-cons are certainly right about one thing: American leadership is indispensable for any 
project to mitigate the present and looming humanitarian horrors of the Twenty-First Century.  
In that they are in accord on that point, would it not be useful as well as pretty for liberal 
humanitarians to reconcile with neo-con militants? Alas, the past generally being prologue, the 
prospect for accord must be judged dim. For what does the past tell us about the nature of these 
militants? It was said of Charles de Gaulle that he loved the idea of France but not the French. So 
in their behavior during the 1980s and in their contemporary stances, neo-conservatives betray 
love of the idea of liberty but something all too much like indifference to the fate of the liberated.  
By our lesser sins are we often revealed. Neo-cons invoked Saddam Hussein’s savagery 
as one justification for invading Iraq.  In doing so, they struck a sympathetic chord in liberal 
hawks, people like the author who have favored intervention in cases of gross inhumanity where 
the predictable collateral damage seemed small in comparison to the human costs of inaction. 
But what credibility can claims of humanity summon when those who make them fail to protect 
the purported beneficiaries of their concern? To invade Iraq without preparing to deploy 
immediately and instruct properly the forces necessary to establish order, to protect the 
inhabitants’ rich cultural legacy and to safeguard the material infrastructure of government and 
the health system is hardly to evince concern for real people as distinguished from abstract ideas. 
Nor is a determination not to tally at least the civilian Iraqi dead and maimed, the collateral 
damage, as it were, of liberation. But it is quite consistent with a cynical power-sharing 
compromise between neo-cons and offensive realists. And it is consistent as well with a 
sentiment that Administration realists and neo-cons appear to possess jointly, which is contempt 
for what liberal humanitarians deem essential: Due regard for the opinion of our old democratic 
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allies and of other peoples with whom we share this Earth. 
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